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DOES FREE TRADE CAUSE HUNGER?
HIDDEN IMPLICATIONS OF THE FTAA
Jonathan B. Wight*
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are
derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which
foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives
occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in
view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another.1
Voluntary free trade has the potential, slowly and gradually over time, to
create "general opulence" because it allows workers to acquire greater competency and
specialization: in a word, workers become more productive. The creation of a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) would expand market areas and thereby potentially
contribute to raising future living standards of workers. This paper seeks to analyze the
theoretical basis for trade, provide an economic overview of FTAA countries, and
analyze the winners and losers from trade.
"Labor" is not a homogenous input, and therefore the effects of FTAA on
"labor" will be diverse. Free trade may exacerbate hunger problems among families in
poor agricultural areas of Latin America where labor markets are uncompetitive, land
rights questionable, or land distribution highly uneven. Accordingly, this paper argues
that free trade works best when labor markets are competitive, when there are
institutional mechanisms guarding property rights, and when those property rights are
fairly evenly distributed.
I. Theoretical Background
Writing in 1776, Adam Smith discusses two primary ways in which trade
benefits workers. First, trade breaks down local monopolies, which lowers consumer
product prices and thereby acts to increase the real wage of workers. Second, trade
allows workers to enhance their productivity through specialization.2 In the famous
example of a pin factory, Smith says: "One man draws out the wire, another straightens
it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it,. . . Those ten persons, therefore, could make
* Jonathan B. Wight is an Associate Professor of Economics in the E. Claiborne Robins
School of Business at the University of Richmond, where he teaches both
undergraduate and graduate courses in global economics. Dr. Wight has been a
consultant to numerous corporate and government organizations, including the
InterAmerican Development Bank and the World Bank. He was named both a Danforth
Fellow and a Doherty Fellow. Dr. Wight has authored two books and published
numerous articles in the field of international economics with a focus on Central and
South America. Research assistance for this paper was ably provided by Rodrigo
Pinto.
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 25
(R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford University Press, 1976) (1776).
2 d. at 15.
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among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day."3 What enables workers
to specialize is a larger market area, and what limits it, are factors that restrict market
size, such as geographical isolation caused by poor transportation networks or political
barriers to trade.
In 1817, David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage added substantially
to our knowledge of the reasons for trade. Ricardo argued that relative costs of
production, rather than absolute costs, provide a broader basis for understanding
mutually beneficial trade. By integrating economies on a worldwide basis, production
is made more efficient because domestic resources are not wasted making products that
can be acquired more cheaply through trade. The immense intellectual power of Smith's
and Ricardo's arguments led to the dramatic rise of free trade policies by the end of the
nineteenth century. Many commentators thus observe that the world economy was
more integrated a hundred years ago than it is today.6 This high level of globalization
in the first decade of the twentieth century collapsed in the second, third, and fourth
decades due to war, depression, and deliberate protectionist policies.
After the end of the Second World War, the pendulum swung again towards
freer trade. The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formed in 1947, and
its successor organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), formed in 1995,
allowed for negotiated reductions in tariff rates from an average of forty-five percent
to about five percent over the last half of the twentieth century.
Despite the strong economic rationale for trade, political factors are likely a
stronger force behind most trade integration movements. The European Union, for
example, was started explicitly as a mechanism for combining energy, steel, and other
key industries in Europe so as to prevent another war between France and Germany.
One can argue that The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was also
created largely for reasons involving illegal immigration and drug interdiction, rather
than on purely economic considerations. The opening of U.S.-China relations was
likewise mainly a Cold War strategy for creating a Soviet-Sino political wedge.
One of the consequences of globalization has been the dramatic rise in both
the volume and value of world trade (Exhibit 1), as trade became an engine of growth
for the world economy after the 1950s. Those areas adopting export-led
industrialization strategies based on comparative advantage saw dramatic increases in
average real incomes. East Asia, for example, with a high index of openness to trade
(Exhibit 2), experienced average growth rates in real per capita income of over five
percent a year from 1965_90. 7 With compounding, the average citizen of this region
experienced a remarkable doubling of their standard of living every fourteen years. For
the most part, this growth was achieved at the same time income distribution became
more evenly distributed.
3 Id. at 15.
4 See DAviD RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 219-222 (Lloyd
Reynolds & William Fellner eds., Irwin Paperback 1964) (1817).
5 See id.
'E.g., Paul Streeten, Integration, Interdependence, and Globalization, FIN. & DEv.,
June 2001, at 34; JOHN MICKLETHWAIT& ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, A FUTURE PERFECT: THE
ESSENTIALS OF GLOBALIZATION (2000).
7 THEW OLRD BANK, THE EAST ASIA MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 2-4
(1993).
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By contrast, Latin America initially engaged in diametrically opposite policies;
ignoring comparative advantage through the use of import-substituting
industrialization (ISI). Domestic consumers in this region, by dint of extremely high
tariffs, were forced to buy domestically-manufactured goods regardless of their quality
or price. This closed market system created enormously inefficient industries and
consumers paid dearly. ISI spawned immense underground economies fed by price
controls and shortages, which led to bribery and corruption. Burgeoning public
deficits led to hyperinflation and capital flight which left an over-hanging foreign debt.
The result was the "lost decade" of the 1980s in which Latin America struggled to
restructure its economies more in line with comparative advantage. Not surprisingly,
average annual per capita income increased less than two percent during the period
1965-90. Unlike trade based on comparative advantage, which produces a net win-win
outcome, ISI produced a net win-lose outcome and therefore income and wealth
distribution widened.
Meanwhile, sub-Saharan Africa, which had the lowest openness to trade
index of any region, saw itscitizens' incomes stagnate or even fall over the period 1960-
90. On average, per capita income in the region rose just one-tenth of one percent a
year.' While no one would suggest that trade is the only--or even the main--reason for
the observed differences in economic growth rates, openness to trade is most likely
positively related to economic growth for the above mentioned reasons. Moreover,
there is no necessary reason that faster growth must be regressive in terms of its
impacts on the poor. Indeed, the poor have the most to gain from faster economic
growth, since the uneducated and untrained laborers are often the last hired in any
economic expansion.
IK Overview of YrAA Countries
Within the context of this globalizing world economy, the FTAA proposes to
create the world's largest market area, comprising approximately 800 million people in
the thirty-four democracies of the Western Hemisphere. Notably excluded by this
criterion is Cuba. 9
As shown in Exhibit 3, a "Free Trade Area- would allow for the unrestricted
trade between member nations, but nations would maintain existing and separate trade
barriers against non-member countries. By contrast, the "Common Market" of the
European Union creates deeper market integration by establishing common external
barriers to trade, and by allowing for free flows of labor in addition to goods and
services. The implication of this difference is that any labor impacts flowing from
FTAA will come from trade effects and capital flows, not from the legal movement or
migration of labor.
Exhibit 4 details the past and existing trading blocks in the Western
Hemisphere. For a variety of reasons, none of these have achieved the permanence or
success anticipated. The impact of FTAA, however, is potentially much greater
because it would provide wide preferential access to the world's largest market, the U.S.
As shown in Exhibit 5, FTAA countries are vastly different in terms of population,
8 THE WORLD BANK, WHY AFRICA HAD To ADJUST: REFORMS, RESULTS, AND THE ROAD
AHEAD 18-26 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
9 See generally Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), at http://www.ftaa-alca.org
(providing an overview of the process creating the FTAA).
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economic size, income levels, industrialization levels, and many other characteristics
of development. The U.S. is by far the largest country, constituting one-third of the
proposed FTAA population and two-thirds of its GDP. The U.S. GDP is nearly eight
times larger than Brazil's (the second largest economy in the region) and twenty-two
times larger than the average GDP in the region. In addition, U.S. per capita income is
nearly $32,000; far higher than the weighted average of $8,023 in all other countries.
This data reinforces the view that FTAA is a partnership of highly unequal partners.
The implication is that the U.S. market is already so sufficiently large and open to world
trade that most of Adam Smiths specialization and anti-monopoly gains to trade have
probably already been achieved. The United States has much less to gain in these
respects than smaller economies that are not as involved in other trading areas.
While the U.S. may have little to gain from trade in terms of additional
economies of scale, the U.S. can still gain from FTAA by reallocating resources based
on Ricardo's comparative advantage. In theory, when two countries specialize based
on comparative advantage, both can gain from voluntary and free trade. More
precisely, both countries can experience an increase in their average standard of living.
Two points are worth emphasizing: averages can mask great differences between
individuals (e.g., the distribution of income will likely change); and, while both
countries gain on average, they probably do not gain equally. The relative gains from
trade depend upon the terms of trade, that is, the price of exports compared to the price
of imports. While the terms of trade represent an important issue for developing
countries and the labor therein, it is outside the scope of this paper.9
A final question regarding the functioning of FTAA is the extent to which
trade within this area will really be "free." For example, the United States and many
other countries still maintain an extensive system of subsidies, quotas, and other price
support activities for agricultural producers. As such, the United States and other
countries engage in a free trade "fraud" according to some commentators.'0 One
particularly egregious example is the U.S. quota on imported sugar. 1 Since Latin
American countries have a clear and compelling comparative advantage in sugarcane
production, the stringent U.S. quota on sugar imports is extremely damaging to foreign
workers and very costly to U.S. consumers. For example, at the same time that the U.S.
was promoting its Caribbean Basin Initiative, Caribbean countries saw their U.S. sugar
quota reduced by more than seventy-five (75%) overthe period from1984 to 1988. 2 The
9The International Monetary Fund tracks changes in commodity terms of trade which
are published periodically in WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. The historical data suggests
that workers in developing countries must work longer hours to buy the same imported
items as before. The reasons for falling terms of trade most likely have to do with the
historical patterns of trade in which developing countries produced raw materials and
minerals and the developed countries produced manufactured goods. As world income
grew, the demand for manufactured goods grew much faster than the demand for the
raw materials to produce them. In addition, manufactured goods are more likely sold in
monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic markets in which producers have greater
pricing power. Commodities are generally sold in more competitive markets in which
producers have very little bargaining power (oil and OPEC being notable exceptions).
1o See e.g. JAMES BovARD, THE FAmR TRADE FRAUD (St. Martin's Press 1991).
"See id. at 71-76 (discussing sugar quotas).
12 Jose Alvarez & Leo C. Polopolus, The Sugar Program: Description and Debate, U.
DOES FREE TRADE CA USE HUNGER?
politics of free trade thus conflict with the economics, and the results from NAFTA
suggest that any FTAA agreement will likely contain numerous agricultural exemptions
and exceptions.13
Other commentators point out that FTAA would mock free trade because of
its strict controls on labor flows but not on capital flows: "[silavery and feudalism are
both based on birth. Immigration and other policies function to protect the high
standard of living of North Americans... a system of privilege based on birth. How
far is that from a global plantation system?"14 If capital is free to migrate to obtain its
highest reward, so should labor, according to this view. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
the FTAA would ever become a Common Market, like the European Union, in which
free labor flows would be allowed.
]KL Winners and Losers From Trade
What allows one country to have a comparative advantage-the lowest
opportunity cost-in production? According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory ,
countries possess a comparative advantage in those goods whose production involves
extensive use of factors of production which that country possesses in abundance.
This common-sense theory suggests, for example, that if the United States is rich in
capital and short on labor, it will likely produce capital-intensive products relatively
cheaper than other countries and produce labor-intensive products relatively more
expensively. The U.S. would consequently be expected to export capital-intensive
goods and to import labor intensive goods. Trade thus impacts owners of resources
differently. In the U.S., trade would enhance the demand for capital resources and
reduce the demand for labor resources. The impact on the distribution of income is
clean "[o]wner's of a country's abundant factors gain from trade, but owners of a
country's scarce factors lose."
16
This theoretical prediction was subjected to its first empirical investigation by
Wassily Leontiet who "discovered" the famous paradox that bears his name. Leontief
"discovered" that, contrary to expectation, the United States actually imports capital-
intensive products! The paradox was resolved when we learn that Leontiefs
measurement of labor inputs was seriously flawed due to inappropriate aggregation.
"Labor" cannot be treated as an interchangeable homogenous input. Rather, labor is
a complex mix ofheterogenous inputs including education, experience, training, health,
attitude, and other factors. When a more precise accounting of the human capital
inputs in labor is made, the Hechscher-Ohlin prediction can be rephrased by
considering labor-augmenting human capital and technology. In this new view, the
United States has abundant labor resources embodied in its research and development
OF FLA. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERV. (June 1998), at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/SC020.
" See generally Leo C. Polopolus et al., Sugar and the North American Free Trade
Agreement: Final Results, U. OF FLA. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERV. (March 1994), at
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODYSC043.
14 Interview with Ben Blevins, Executive Director, Highland Support Project (Oct. 3,
2001).
1' For this discovery, Bertil Ohlin received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1977.
16 PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
POLICY 77 (4th ed., Addison-Wesley 1997).
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scientists, skilled labor, and semi-skilled labor. 17 U.S. exports will likely be products rich
in those resources (e.g., intellectual property and services),18 the U.S. has very small
shares of unskilled labor, and this implies that the losers from trade in the U.S. will be
unskilled labor, who under free trade will now compete with unskilled labor from around
the world.
Job losses in the United States due to trade hit textiles and other low-skill,
labor-intensive, industries particularly hard. Workers in these industries who lack the
mobility to move to other areas clearly constitute the "losers" from free trade.' 9 The
winners from trade in the United States include makers of engines and turbines, and
construction and mining machinery.2 Even so, most estimates suggest that trade is
not a significant factor explaining the widening income gaps between the rich and poor
in America. Far more important in explaining this effect are the dramatic changes in the
technology of production, which make unskilled workers obsolete even in industries
not threatened by trade.2' The introduction of cheap imports from low-wage countries
accounts for only a small fraction of this trend22 This is readily apparent when we
observe that imports, although growing rapidly, still account for less than fifteen
percent of national income in the United States.
The bottom line is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of "labor"
impacts of the FTAA in a generic way. Labor is an amorphous concept, and requires
refinements in definition before anything substantive can be said. Furthermore, the
institutional market structure under which labor is hired matters. For these reasons this
paper analyzes a particular type of labor in a particular market setting: rural labor in
Central America.
17 See DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 118 (5th ed., Prentice-Hall 1995)
(providing estimates of the factor endowments of different countries).
18 The U.S. will continue to import a high proportion of capital-intensive products
simply because of its large oil imports. Oil extraction and refining use large amounts of
capital and relatively little labor.
19 See generally RtcARo, supra note 5, at 219-222 (Ricardo argues that trade outcomes
reflect relative, not absolute, differences in productivity. Given his insights, workers
making clothing in the United States are actually somewhat more productive in an
absolute sense than overseas workers. The reason they are hurt by trade is because
the United States a lot more productive in other sectors.)
20 SALVATORE, supra note 17, at 69.
21 Id. (In addition, deliberate policy changes have also reduced the relative distribution
of income for those at the bottom: income taxes have become less progressive over the
past twenty years, and the minimum wage has not kept pace with inflation since the
1970s).
22See ADRIAN WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND INCOME INEQUALITY 108,
159-61(Clarendon Press, 1994); Robert Z. Lawrence & Mathew J. Slaughter, Trade and
U.S. Wages: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
Acnvlrr 161, 172-73, 179 (1993); see also Paul Krugman, The Spiral of Inequality,
MOTHER JONES, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 44 (providing an overview generally favorable to
labor).
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IV. Rural Labor in Central America
Rural workers in Latin America are substantially poorer than urban workers.
Many factors contribute to holding down wages in rural areas, namely, poor peasant
productivity due to small plots, low yields, and government policies that have been
biased against agricultural output and earnings. Historically, these detrimental policies
have included overvalued exchange rates that limit export earnings, credit rationing,
and price controls.23
Alongside small-scale peasant agriculture in Latin America, the past centuries
have seen large agricultural estates developed as export-enclaves in coffee, sugar,
bananas, cacao, and other products. In rural areas of Latin America, large estates
control the lion's share of land: seventy-two percent of the land under cultivation in
Latin America is owned by only one percent of the population.24 These enclaves
typically exhibit labor market conditions known as "monopsony": one buyer of labor
and many sellers of labor.25
The monopsony power of these estates is created and heightened by a variety
of factors which make it difficult for workers to find employment elsewhere. Bad roads
and poor public transportation limit the possibility of commuting to work and raise the
cost of searching for work elsewhere. Poor communication skills further intensify these
problems: many in the population are illiterate and the region's infrastructure lacks
telephones. In addition, indigenous rural workers often speak traditional languages
and dialects that make it difficult for them to communicate in the language of commerce
and of the conquistadors (Spanish or Portuguese). In Guatemala, for example, native
Indians comprise fifty-five percent of the population and speak fifty-three non-Spanish
languages' 6 Workers may also be unable to migrate because of heavy indebtedness
to company stores run by the plantation, which make workers subject to arrest if they
leave. Finally, migrants are in many cases unable to search for better jobs because of
laws restricting immigration.
27
One predictable consequence of such monopsony conditions is that
employers can succeed in paying wages below the value of the workees marginal
product-in essence, "exploiting" the worker. It is imperative to note that the existence
of low wages alone does not constitute evidence of exploitation, because low wages
exist in competitive labor markets when workers are simply not very productive.
Rather, exploitation exists when a poorly developed market structure-or outright
collusion among employers-limits competitive forces from raising the wages of
workers up to the value of their marginal products. Adam Smith was well aware of this
problem, saying, "whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters [employers] rarely
combine [to create a monopsony], is as ignorant of the world as of the subject."
28
' See M ICHAEL P. TODARo, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 508-09 (7th ed., 2000).24 Id. at 373.
21 Such markets arise in the United States in coal-mining towns or one-mill towns, where
there is only one major employer.
26SEL, Int'l, Languages of Guatemala, at http://www.ethnologue.com/show-country.
asp?name=Guatemala (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (formerly known as the Summer
Institute of Linguistics).
27As noted earlier, the FTAA provides free trade in merchandise and in capital, but
does not allow the free movement of labor to seek its highest return.
2S ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 28 (William Benton ed., 1952) (1776); see also
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In this setting it is important to examine how free trade would affect two labor
groups in rural areas in Latin America: peasant farmers working small private plots and
workers at large-scale monopsony enclaves.
An earlier section of this paper suggests that the creation of FTAA would
enhance the demand for labor resources used in making export products. For example,
this could entail labor-intensive cultivation of winter crops in Guatemala, such as fresh
fruits and vegetables demanded in the U.S. In theory, labor used in making export
products would earn higher returns from trade. This assumes labor markets are
competitive, so a rise in demand for labor is translated into a significant gain in
earnings for that resource. Inmonopsony, the gains to trade would disproportionately
go to the monopsonist, not the worker. Even so, assuming all other factors are
constant, a rise in demand for export workers will increase wage rates even in a
monopsony market.
Eliminating monopsony structures, however, could greatly enhance the gains
to trade for the poorest laborers in Central America. For example, a study of sub-
Saharan Africa by the World Bank found that virtually every agricultural and mineral
export industry was plagued withmonopsony, generally run by the government itself
as a means of raising revenues.29 The World Bank has made eliminating monopsony
a priority in liberalizing markets in developing countries.
In regards to peasant workers, free trade means that Guatemalan consumers
will be competing with American consumers for the use of land resources in Guatemala.
Since U.S. consumers have higher incomes, U.S. consumers can easily"bid away" land
resources that formerly were used to produce staple foods for domestic consumption
in Guatemala, shifting them to production of exotic food for export to the U.S. (in which
the value-added is higher). In turn, staple food production in Guatemala will fall as
resources are diverted into agricultural export products.
This is only half of the story. Guatemala would now be producing products
for which it commands a comparative advantage. Its earnings from exotic fruits and
vegetables will more than compensate for its losses of domestic staple crops, and it
now would have the export earnings needed to buy cheap staples of wheat and corn
from the United States. In theory, Guatemalans are better off from trade since they will
not be wasting resources trying to grow corn in a mountainous environment, when
mechanized farms in Kansas can produce corn more easily and inexpensively. Trade
based on comparative advantage can thus provide Guatemala with a higher average
standard of living even if domestic staple food production falls.
The downside of this story is that average incomes can rise even if the
benefits are highly skewed. Will rural workers making exotic fruits and vegetables in
Guatemala have the income to buy the imported staples from the U.S.? If workers
owned the land in production, this would obviously be true. But as noted earlier, land
is very unevenly owned in Latin America. Therefore, as demand for export resources
grows to meet the U.S. demand, land will be diverted from small-scale diversified
peasant farming to more specialized farming. Trade would provide incentives for the
greater concentration of land into larger plots needed for commercial farming.
id. at 35-36 (referring to the oppression of workers).
29 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 9, at 232-39 (outlining data on specific industries
and countries).
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However, peasants are unlikely to be the ones doing the consolidating
because they lack the credit, education, training, and other characteristics that make
such a transition easier. It is far more likely that a rise in demand for land would cause
taxes on land to rise, forcing peasants off the land when they are unable to pay the
higher taxes. Larger farming operations would then consolidate the land, and peasants
would change from being independent self-sufficient producers of staple foods to day
laborers in a monopsony labor market. Their real standard of living would likely fall.
In darker terms, there are Latin American countries in which property rights
are undefined and/or not well protected. Land titles may have traditionally been oral,
passed down to a village. In such settings the potential for land fraud, corruption, and
theft is immense, and many cases have been observed, leading to "land wars '.30 Under
these various scenarios, land is more likely to become consolidated into modern, large
scale agriculture, and the peasants relegated to working as day laborers. If market
conditions are those of a monopsony described above, workers may be exploited. The
bottom line for peasants is that their real incomes could fall, with hunger being the
result of free trade in food.
3 1
V. Beneficial Impacts of Trade
This highly pessimistic scenario should be tempered with other observations.
First, the disappointing results for labor noted above flowed from a variety of
institutional factors which are not the fault of trade per se. Trade highlights the
problems that already exist in these societies-income and wealth inequalities, lack of
institutions, and a fabric ofjustice. However, free and voluntary trade is not the cause
of these problems ,32 suggesting that institutional changes-such as protection of
indigenous property rights, and the amelioration of the conditions which give rise to
monopsony labor markets-are both desirable and possible. Trade may act as a
stimulus for these changes.
For example, in Guatemala the end of civil war and the reduction in death
squad activities has produced a window of opportunity for Mayans living in the
highlands to begin producing small manufacturing products for export. This provides
a demand for labor that competes with the coffee and banana plantations on the coast.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been working to create U.S. market
3o See JORGE AMADO, THE VIOLENT LAND (Samuel Putnam trans,1974) (providing a
particularly graphic account in novelized form of the history of land wars during the
cacao boom in Brazil).
31 See also HUNGRY FOR PROFIT (Robert Richter Prod. 1994) (making a controversial
charge espoused by numerous critics of free trade).
32 Many would object to this sentence by noting that while trade may not be the
proximate cause of these structural problems, it is certainly a strongly contributing
factor in the historical development of Latin America. Going back to the conquest and
the mercantile and colonial trading system, trade was indeed carried out behind the
barrel of a gun. U.S. imperialism is also cited as a factor contributing to the lack of
judicial processes (e.g., the alleged CIA overthrow of democratically-elected
governments in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1972). With one or two exceptions,
however, governments in Latin America are today democratically elected. The horrors
of previous trading systems based on involuntary participation and uncompetitive
markets do not necessarily presage the relevant outcomes in the 2 1' century.
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openings in textiles, silver, pottery, weaving, and other products.33 Needless to say,
there is a huge learning curve for small scale artisans to produce for export, and many
barriers of language, shipping, financing, marketing, and retailing to overcome.
Nevertheless, this growth in non-traditional exports has been rapid. Seen in this light,
trade can provide the impetus for economic growth and development even in a country
beset by institutional constraints.
VL Conclusions
The FTAA would join together a disparate group of countries, bound more
by geographical proximity than by cultural or economic affinities. Workers in the
United States are concerned that the FTAA will produce the "giant sucking sound" of
jobs flowing to low-wage countries in FTAA.34 By contrast, workers in poorer FTAA
countries worry that their jobs will be lost to highly productive U.S. workers with far
more capital and technology at their fingertips. To some extent, both groups of workers
have reason to worry. Modem trade theory suggests that while free trade would raise
average standards of living in both countries, there will also be changes in the
distribution of income. Some owners of resources will be made better off, and others
worse off, from trade. The key political issue is whether the winners will compensate
the losers so that trade can move forward. Since the winners from trade are often a
decentralized group of unorganized consumers, while the losers from trade are often
highly organized special interests, such political deals may be hard to structure. On the
other hand, some worry that a "Greshan~s Law" of regulation will reduce workplace
safety and environmental issues to the lowest common denominator.35 In practice, there
is little evidence of trade causing this to happen. The experience of NAFTA suggests
that "if a society wishes to preserve a set of distinct institutions, globalization need not
prevent it from doing so.
"36
Regarding rural labor in Latin America, free trade could create the potential for
greater hunger if labor markets are not competitive or if property rights are weak. In
such a scenario, consumers in America bid away land resources from staple food
production toward exotic food production for consumption in America. In this case the
31 See The Highland Support Project of Guatemala, available at
http://www.highlandsupportproject.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2001) (illustrating an
example of such an NGO).
34 The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of 3d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton andPerot,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at A20 (noting Ross Perot's famous prediction for NAFTA).
35 Sir Thomas Gresham observed in 1664 that two types of commodity money, say gold
and silver, cannot for long both circulate as money. One of these invariably becomes
overvalued and is spent; the other becomes undervalued and is hoarded. Loosely
construed, "Bad money drives out good money." Applied to labor regulation and trade,
Gresham's Law would suggest that a country which tries to enforce "strong" workplace
safety rules in a globalized economy will experience job losses in those industries.
Factories will move overseas where regulators are more lax. In other words, "Weak
regulators drive out strong regulators." As noted in the text, however, there is no
evidence that this has actually happened. Rather, environmental and labor regulations
may be strengthening around the world as a consequence of trade agreements.
36 Michael R. Smith, What Have the FTAA and the NAFTA Done to the Canadian
Labor Market? 30 F. FOR SOC. ECON. 2,25-50 (Spring 2001).
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benefits to trade may flow not to workers but to landowners. This pessimistic
possibility is mitigated by alternative sources of rural employment, which, if developed,
could make trade an engine of growth for the rural poor in Central America.
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Exhibit 1
World Exports and World GDP
Source: Gene Huang, Economics of the Transportation Industry, Federal Express
Finance Learning Development Center, (June 2001) (on file with author).
Exhibit 2
Regional Differences in Openness to Trade and Growth Rates
Openness to Trade Average Annual Per Approximate Doubling
xinex* Capita GNP Growth, Tmie ofPer Capila
1965-90 (%) Inome (Years)
East Asia 32 5.3 13.6
Latiamerin 2.5 1.8 40.0
Sub-Saharan Afica 0.8 0.1 720.0
Sources: THE WORLD BANK, THE EasI ASIA MRACLE 2 (1993); THE WORLD BANK, WHY
AFRICA HAD TOAD uST 25 (1994).
* A high score corresponds to more outward orientation over the period 1965-85.
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Exhibit 3
Types of Trading Arrangements
Type Defmiaon Examples
Trade Preference Association Each member establishes lower BangkokAgreement
govenmatal baniersagainst imports of
goods from oder nmbers dana in
oompareimpors fro rmm ber
co rlies.
Free Trade Area Membercomumies eliminae all governmental NAFTA'
barriers on trade between heir counies, but ASEAN 2
maintain existing and separate barriers
against nonmember couneies.
Customs Union limina all trade barriers as inafree trade CACM'
association, but all menber nations agree to
have identical barriers to nonmember
ooun=es (e.g., a commn ttifflbanier)
Common Market A customs union, in which in addition to Eumpean Union
the fiee trade ofrerdandise goods, iere is Mer 4osra
also flee movnent oflabor, capitaL and
services between member countries.
Source: Norman S. Fieleke, One Trading World, or Many: The Issue ofRegional
Trading Blocs, NEWFEG. ECON. REv. (May/June 1992).
'North American Free Trade Agreement.
2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
3 Central American Common Market.
4 Southern Cone Common Market, also called Mercosur.
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Exhibit 4
Western Hemisphere Trade Arrangements
Year Merbers GoaLv
Est.
Andean Community 1969 Bolivia, Columbia, Coemmm1 ri
Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela
Caribbean 1973 Antigua and Barbuda, Cannanmark
Community Bahamas, Barados,
Belize,Doinica,
Guyana, Grenada,
Jamaica, Montserrat, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St Vincent and
the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago
Central American 1961 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Customs union
Common Market Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua
Canada-U.S. FTA 1989 Canada and U.S. Free trade area
Mercosur 1994 Argentina, Brail, Comman
Paraguay, Uruguay
NAFrA 1994 Canada, Mexico, and Free rade area
United States
Source: JAMES GERBER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 353 (1999).
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Exhibit5
Development Indicators for 34 FTAA Countries (1999)
Ranked by Population Size
Country Name Population GDP Per Capita Exports Paved
(millions) (PPP*- GDP (% of Roads (% of
S millions) (PPP* S) GDP) total)
32 United States 273.0 8.967,673 31 872 110* 59
7 Brazil 168.0 1,181,980 7,037 11 10
22 Mexico 96.6 801,326 8.297 31 34"*
10 Colombia 41.5 238,797 51749 18 14
2 Argentina 36.6 449,093 12.277 10 29
8 Canada 31.0 800,424 26,251 44 35
26 Peru 252 116,623 4,622 is 13"
34 Venezuela RB 23.7 130,268 5,495 22 N/A
9 Chile 15.0 129,933 8.652 29 19
14 Ecuador 12.4 37, 167 2,994 37 19
17 Guatemala 11.1 40,734 3,674 19 35
13 Dominican Rep. 8-4 46,286 5,507 30 79**
6 Bolivia 8.1 19,161 2.355 17 N/A
19 Haiti 7-8 11,427 1,464 12 N/A
20 Honduras 6.3 14,780 2,340 43 20
15 El Salvador 6.2 26.732 4,344 25 N/A
25 Paraguay 5.4 23,493 4,384 23 N/A
23 Nicaragua 4.9 11,211 2.279 34 N/A
11 Costa Rica 3.6 31,798 8,860 54 22
33 Uruguay 3.3 29,415 8,879 18 N/A
24 Panama 2.8 16.516 5,875 33 35
21 Jamaica 2.6 9.251 3,561 49 N/A
31 Trinidad/Tobago 1.3 10.570 8,176 50 N/A
18 Guyana 0.9 3,116 3.640 99 N/A
30 Suriname 0.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 The Bahamas 0.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 Barbados 0.3 3,828 14,353 50 99
5 Belize 0.2 1,224 4,959 49 N/A
28 St. Lucia 0.2 850 5,509 58 N/A
29 St. Vincent/Gren. 0.1 606 5.309 52 N/A
16 Grenada 0.1 661 6,817 49 N/A
12 Dominica 0.1 396 5,425 58 N/A
I Antigua/Barbuda 0.1 689 10,225 71 N/A
27 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0 474 11,596 48 N/A
31 Aruba 0.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
26 Cayman Islands 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
29 Sao Tome and Prin. 0.1 N/A N/A 35 N/A
FTAA 797.5 13,056,502 16 195"** 16"**
FTAA minus U.S. 523.7 4,188.829 8,023"0 23**
US share in FTAA 0.34 0.68
TH. WRL. .N .. ORD. AN. .. ELPMN INICTOS 2UI)
Source: THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK )EVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2001).
* Market exchange rates diverge widely from purchasing power parity
because of financial flows and other factors. Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) estimates convert Gross Domestic Product from local currencies into
U.S. dollars using an estimate of the PPP exchange rate.
** 1998 data.
* Weighted averages based on population size (for per capita GDP) and
GDP size (for export ratios.
